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Abstract 
 
This paper looks at a dynamic process in a partial market where there are lags in the 
adjustment of the consumers as a group, and where the firms are not perfectly equal. What I 
model is the movements of price and realized quantum of a market good given the 
allocation of the demand and supply curves. A major conclusion is that given the 
circumstances, the system will always converge to the equilibrium point in the long run, but 
if shocks occur, the market allocation of price and realized quantum of the good may very 
well remain in disequilibrium. Unless one studies a particular market, it is not possible to 
make a precise general description of how the movements in disequilibrium behave 
quantitatively and describe the speed of convergence to equilibrium. However, qualitative 
conclusions are more easily drawn on a general basis. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
This paper looks at a dynamic process (Tâtonement process) in a partial market where there 
are lags in the adjustment of the consumers as a group, and where there are some 
differences, although not  large, among the firms. What I mean by “lags in adjustment” is 
that the group of consumers does not adapt instantaneously to a price change, but needs 
some time before settling in a steady state where the consumers’ preferences are optimized. 
The purpose is to create a foundation for how dynamic processes may occur in reality, and 
see how partial markets potentially behave when not residing in equilibrium. What I model 
is the movements of price and realized quantum of a market good given the allocation of the 
demand and supply curves. Current location of these curves, as well as shocks changing 
them, are exogenous factors not explained. Central questions are which side of the market 
dominates in deciding the driving forces’ movements, whether or not the system moves 
towards equilibrium and how movements may develop and at what speed. 
 
Although the theme of this paper is related to microeconomics, the way of analyzing is 
similar to what is more often used in macroeconomics. Figures similar to phase diagrams are 
introduced and split into sets, which are used for explaining how the system behaves in 
different market circumstances. Different scenarios are discussed. 
 
It is important to underline that the model in this paper in general is of speculative nature, 
as I cannot claim with confidence that it is well applied in reality. The model is mostly a 
result of my own philosophizing, and an interesting next step would be to challenge it 
through empirical research.  
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2. Framework 
 
Three assumptions are central to this model, these works as a framework for the following 
dynamic analysis. In this section each of these assumptions will be given a detailed 
explanation, regarding why I choose them and what implications they have. 
 
2.1 Assumption 1 
 
Assumption 1: The market of interest is not affected by other markets. That is, I look at a 
partial market model. 
 
The reason I use a partial market is mostly because it is convenient, not because it is a better 
choice than using a general equilibrium framework. Franklin M. Fisher (1983) argues in his 
book “Disequilibrium foundations of equilibrium economics” that when it comes to market 
dynamics and questions about stability, it is not sufficient to use a partial market in the 
analysis. He argues that since partial market approaches only observe the behavior of the 
given market, assuming that all other prices are constant, they will miss out the extended 
effects of price changes in other markets. Thus, even if one concludes that a partial market 
will obtain stability over time given constant prices in all other markets, this will be a waste 
of knowledge if the same is not true for the general market case where all markets are 
endogenous. And vice versa: if stability is not obtained in the partial market, but is so when 
all markets are under consideration, the latter should be of interest since the partial case is 
not close to reality and will therefore never happen. 
 
I have no intentions of arguing against Fisher. A partial market is used in this paper merely 
because it is easier than the general case, as the latter demands a large set of difference 
equations to describe all changes in every market. It is also plausible to expect mutual 
dependence in many of these equations. As a consequence, the model in this paper is 
probably best applied as either an approximation of reality, which is better the smaller or 
more isolated the market of interest is, or just as a foundation for strengthening the 
intuition of the reader. 
 
2.2 Assumption 2 
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Assumption 2: There is lag in adjustment of the consumers as a group, because of habit 
formation. 
 
The behavior aspect of consumers and firms in this partial market is used as a tool for 
connecting the theoretical market aspect to reality, and the reason I want to model a lag in 
the adjustment of the consumers is two-sided. Firstly, it is intrinsically interesting to see how 
a market may behave when the consumer group has this attribute, as it can be argued to be 
a way of better adapting the model to reality. Secondly, it is a way of creating a driving force 
for the dynamics of the model. The last point will be a major focus of this paper and will be 
returned to in section 3.2, “The driving forces of the consumers”, while the first point will be 
explained in more detail just below. 
 
There are several arguments for why it is plausible for the consumer group to have 
adjustment lags: 
- As a result of habit formation, each consumer may individually have lags in his or her 
adjustment of consumption as a response to a price change. If a consumer is used to 
a certain consumption level and to some degree disfavors change of habits, the 
person in question will not react instantaneously to a change of prices, and it takes 
some time to adjust to any new ideal quantum of demand. Thus, there are 
differences in short and long term preferences. 
- The argument above can be strengthened by giving room for differences among 
consumers, and at the same time let consumers influence each other. This is the case 
with trends, where some start consuming a good, and others follow gradually, until a 
steady state eventually is reached (if the trend is not just a passing fashion). 
- Furthermore, consumers may exhibit some lack of self-knowledge, in the sense that 
they actually do not have a clear idea of how much of the good they are willing to 
buy for each price level. When a change of price actually occurs the consumers 
change their consumption only gradually, until reaching the real preferred quantum 
given this new price level. An interpretation of this is that even though individual 
demand curves exist, consumers are not perfectly aware of their demand curves’ 
shape or location. 
A simple way to summarize this assumption is to consider an optimization behavior of 
consumers with a utility function where the utility of time 𝑡 depends on both consumption 
today and on the change of consumption from the previous period: 
𝑢(𝑐𝑡, |∆𝑐𝑡|, |∆𝑝𝑡|) ≡ 𝑢𝑡, 
where  
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𝜕𝑢𝑡
𝜕𝑐𝑡
>  0, 𝜕2𝑢𝑡
𝜕𝑐𝑡2
< 0, 
and 
𝜕𝑢𝑡
𝜕|∆𝑐𝑡| < 0 
for all 𝑡, and |∆𝑐𝑡| and |∆𝑝𝑡| can be interpreted as the absolute value of the change of 
respectively consumption and price from time 𝑡 − 1 to time 𝑡, that is ∆𝑥𝑡 =  𝑥𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡−1.  For 
simplicity, the partial effect of these changes on utility is assumed to be independent of 
whether the changes are positive or negative. The reason for including |∆𝑝𝑡| in the utility 
function will not be explained until section 4.2; for now it is sufficient to think of this 
argument as a way of including price uncertainty and instability caused by price changes as 
factors influencing the utility of the consumers. 
 
2.3 Assumption 3 
 
Assumption 3: The firms are not perfectly equal. 
 
The main reason for this third assumption is also two-sided. Firstly, I believe that firms are 
likely to have some differences in their cost functions due to different technologies, even 
within the same market. The consequence is that they may not show the exact same 
behavior, and their products may not be perfectly equal. In a partial equilibrium context, this 
means that the goods different firms produce are not perfect substitutes, although quite 
close (or else a partial approach would not be appropriate). This again means that there is 
room for small deviations in the price each firm sets for the market good, even though they 
do not possess any true market power, and the environment is otherwise competitive. 
 
This leads to the second aspect: that it is a practical tool for solving a problem occurring 
when considering dynamic market processes, namely the problem of how market price 
actually changes. For instance, Fisher describes the difficulty of using the theory of individual 
behavior to explain price movement: 
 
The equilibrium theory of individual competitive behavior on which we shall build is one in 
which prices are taken as given and quantities optimally set. This can readily be extended to 
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take price expectations as given. But, as Koopmans (1957) among others has remarked, in a 
world in which all prices are taken as given, how do prices ever change? 
- Franklin M. Fisher, Disequilibrium foundations of equilibrium economics, 1983, page 
12. 
 
My argument is that although market price often is considered as something both the 
consumers and firms take for granted, it is still possible to look at prices as endogenous for 
the firms in the short run. A real life example illustrates the point. Norway has two major 
tabloid daily newspapers, VG and Dagbladet, which are very similar products both in design, 
size, content et cetera. Yet the price of VG, which is the best selling one, is today 12 NOK on 
weekdays, while the price of Dagbladet is 15 NOK. Since they are more or less always put 
right next to each other when sold in stores, the reason for different prices can not be 
because of transportation costs (for consumers) or lack of information about the other 
good’s allocation, but is more likely caused by differentiations between the two products. If 
the publisher of VG decided to raise the price to 13 NOK given everything else unchanged, 
they could loose readers, but I believe they would still keep enough to sustain a major share 
of the daily tabloid newspaper market. If they were to raise the price to 25 NOK, the story 
might be quite different. The point is that with small differences between the firms and their 
products, small differences and changes in price are possible without facing severe losses of 
sale. The firms thus have some range of prices they can choose from without falling out of 
the market due to severe losses, and from this range they will choose the price maximizing 
their profit given their cost function. This range gets narrower the more equal the firms and 
their products are, and with perfect equality they can only choose one point which is the 
market price. However, I cannot think of a single market that behaves in such a perfect way. 
 
The implication this assumption has for my model, is that firms to some extent are able to 
change the price of their products, and this in turn can work as a key to how market price 
actually changes over time. If one firm increases its price by a small amount, and then other 
firms do the same, this can be a repeated process where the result is a substantial change of 
market price. Such a process is one way of answering the complex questions about which 
economic agents are in charge of prices (for instance asked in Microeconomic Theory by 
Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green), and how it is possible that prices ever change. I will 
present a more in-depth discussion of this last topic and Assumption 3 in general in the 
appendix at the end of the paper. 
 
For now, it is important to ascertain that the small amount of market power each firm 
possesses does not imply that we are considering a monopolistic model. For instance, if a 
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single firm fails to supply enough of its product relative to consumer demand, the products 
of the competitors are sufficiently close substitutes to work as adequate replacements for 
the consumers. And the model still works with perfect competition in the sense that the 
firms do not have the power to set the price in any way they want, they always have to keep 
it close to a certain level. 
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3. The separate driving forces 
 
In this part of the paper I will separately explain the driving forces for the dynamics of 
realized price of the market good and its quantum, and how these two elements change 
separately, taking the other as given. I start by explaining what is meant by the market 
equilibrium in this model and defining eight different sets outside the equilibrium point. 
These sets are then used in the explanation of separate movements in price and quantum. 
 
To keep the analysis simple, I have chosen to use discrete time in this paper. The notations 
∆𝑥 and ∆𝑝 define changes of quantum and price with respect to time 𝑡. 
 
3.1 Equilibrium and sets of disequilibrium 
 
The equilibrium is the point where ∆𝑥 = 0 and ∆𝑝 = 0 simultaneous, and is therefore a 
steady state of this model, where neither price nor quantum are going to change. There is 
one unique such equilibrium, which is the point where the demand and supply curves 
intersect. In other words, the steady state equilibrium is the same equilibrium as the 
standard market equilibrium. The intuition behind this is that at this point both suppliers and 
demanders are satisfied with the allocation of price and realized quantum of the good, 
leading to no interest in change. 
 
If I denote demand by 𝐷(𝑝) and supply by 𝑆(𝑝), the stady state equilibrium is the unique 
point (given that it exist) where 𝐷(𝑝) =  𝑆(𝑝) and 𝑥 > 0,𝑝 > 0. Further I can define four 
different two-dimensional sets in relation to this, all in the area of strictly positive price and 
quantum. 
Set I: All allocations where 𝑥 > 𝐷(𝑝) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥 > 𝑆(𝑝). 
Set II: All allocations where 𝑥 > 𝐷(𝑝) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥 < 𝑆(𝑝). 
Set III: All allocations where 𝑥 < 𝐷(𝑝) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥 < 𝑆(𝑝). 
Set IV: All allocations where 𝑥 < 𝐷(𝑝) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥 > 𝑆(𝑝). 
 
In addition to these four sets and the equilibrium, there are four different one-dimensional 
sets: 
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Set 𝑆+: All allocations where 𝑥 = 𝑆(𝑝) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥 > 𝐷(𝑝). 
Set 𝑆−: All allocations where 𝑥 = 𝑆(𝑝) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥 < 𝐷(𝑝). 
Set 𝐷+: All allocations where 𝑥 = 𝐷(𝑝) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥 > 𝑆(𝑝). 
Set 𝐷−: All allocations where 𝑥 = 𝐷(𝑝) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥 < 𝑆(𝑝). 
 
All the sets just defined will be used as references from now on. Figure 1 gives a graphical 
illustration of the sets. 
 
 
 
In order to explain the mechanics of this model, I will look at the perspectives of the 
consumers and the producers separately, before combining them using Figure 1. 
 
3.2 The driving forces of the consumers 
 
Along the demand curve, the consumers are satisfied with the allocation of price and 
quantum of the good, and it is thus possible to state that  
∆𝑥𝐷 = 0 
Demand 
𝑥 
𝑝 
Supply 
Equilibrium 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
𝑆+ 
𝑆− 
𝐷− 
𝐷+ 
Figure 1 
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∆𝑝𝐷 = 0 
along this curve. The notation implies that the consumers are satisfied with what they 
consume, and have no incentives to change this quantum given price or to bargain for any 
other price given quantum. The difference equations equal zero to express this, and “𝐷” is 
used to underline that it is from the demanders’ perspective. 
 
If the allocation for some reason is to the left of the demand curve, the consumers want to 
either consume more, or they are willing to pay a higher price for the amount they already 
consume. I mark this by stating that ∆𝑥𝐷 > 0 and ∆𝑝𝐷 > 0 in this case, to show the direction 
of movement as a consequence of the driving forces of market allocation resulting from the 
consumers’ behavior. 
 
Here it is important to refer to Assumption 2. Because of the lag in the consumers’ 
adjustment, we will not experience an immediate jump from an allocation outside the 
demand curve directly to the curve, because the consumers adapt gradually. To clarify: if the 
allocation already resides along the demand curve, and a sudden change of economic 
environment happens causing the demand curve to make a rightward shift, the allocation 
will not immediately shift to somewhere along the new demand curve were it only for the 
consumers to decide. Instead it would move gradually towards it over time. This is illustrated 
in Figure 2. 
 
 𝑥 
𝑝 
•  
•  
∆𝑥𝐷 > 0 
∆𝑝𝐷 > 0 
Demand, old 
Demand, new 
A 
B 
Figure 2 
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Let us say that the good of interest is a certain kind of ecological food, and that the 
rightward shift of the demand curve is caused by a period of positive media attention 
towards such products. Because the consumers get more interested in this kind of product, 
they are willing to pay more for what they already consume of the good, and they want 
more of the good. Some people are what could be called “trend-setters”, meaning they are 
easily willing to change their consumption towards this ecological food, implying that for 
them the utility loss of change, 𝜕𝑢𝑡/𝜕|∆𝑐𝑡|, is relatively low. Others need more persuasion 
to consider any change, meaning that it takes some time before the true effect of this 
demand curve change is realized. The result is that over time, aggregate consumption 
gradually rises, as well as the possibility of a higher price level due to increased willingness to 
pay. 
 
At some point however, the effects of the shock will settle. This happens when both price 
and consumption have risen so much that the new demand curve is reached, at point B in 
the figure above. Thus, I can state that lim
𝑡→∞
𝑥𝐷(𝑡) = 𝑘𝐷𝑥 ,𝑎𝑛𝑑 lim
𝑡→∞
𝑝𝐷(𝑡) = 𝑘𝐷𝑝 , 
where 𝑘𝐷𝑥  and 𝑘𝐷
𝑝  are constants. This illustrates that when only the consumers are taken into 
consideration, the allocation will eventually settle. 
 
The opposite is true to the right of the demand curve. Here ∆𝑥𝐷 < 0 and ∆𝑝𝐷 < 0 will be the 
case, as consumers want less of the good of interest, or are not willing to pay the current 
price for continuing to consume the same amount. Again the change will occur gradually 
because of habit formation, until the demand curve is reached. 
 
To conclude: 
- ∆𝑥𝐷 = 0 and ∆𝑝𝐷 = 0 at the sets 𝐷− and 𝐷+ and at the equilibrium point. 
- ∆𝑥𝐷 < 0 and ∆𝑝𝐷 < 0 in Set I, Set II and Set 𝑆+.  
- ∆𝑥𝐷 > 0 and ∆𝑝𝐷 > 0 in Set III, Set IV and Set 𝑆−.  
The same information is summarized in Figure 3, with arrows showing the directions of the 
driving forces. 
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3.3  The driving forces of the firms 
 
3.3 The driving forces of the firms 
 
Now I will do a similar analysis as the one done for consumers above, this time regarding the 
behavior of the firms or producers. All combinations of price and quantum of the market 
good along the supply curve are allocations where the firms are satisfied with the amount 
they supply given the price level, from a profit maximizing point of view. This also means 
that given the current quantum of supply, the firms do not prefer any marginal change of 
price. This can be formulated by stating that 
∆𝑥𝑆 = 0, 
∆𝑝𝑆 = 0 
along the supply curve. The interpretation of these equations is that there are no driving 
forces for changing price given supplied level and vice versa from the suppliers’ point of view. 
 
Notice, however, that if the firms had the theoretical choice of freely changing both price 
and quantum of the good, there would probably exist a point among the profit maximizing 
points on the supply curve where profit was the largest possible. In practice this is irrelevant 
since the firms cannot choose freely when also consumers are taken into consideration. 
 
Demand  
𝑥 
𝑝 
Supply 
Equilibrium 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
𝑆+ 
𝑆− 
𝐷− 
𝐷+ 
Figure 3 
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Also notice that although ∆𝑝𝑆 = 0 may give the impression that there exists a specific price 
𝑝𝑆, this is only partly true. The expression ∆𝑝𝑆 = 0 means that the firms have no need to 
change their own price level, however it is not the same as stating that they all settle at the 
same price level 𝑝𝑆. As explained earlier, the firms are free to make certain deviations of 
price within a small range, so the intuition behind a stable market price is either that the 
firms by coincidence end up with exactly the same price level in steady state,  or that the 
market price can be regarded as an average price among the firms. The important point is 
the dynamic perspective, which is that when ∆𝑝𝑆 = 0, no individual firm wants to change 
the price level set, given the small range of possibilities they have. 
 
At all allocations to the left of the supply curve, the driving forces from the firms’ perspective 
will be such that given the amount they already supply, ∆𝑥𝑆 > 0, and given the price of their 
products ∆𝑝𝑆 < 0. The inequality ∆𝑥𝑆 > 0 simply means that at the given market price, the 
firms want to produce and sell more goods as this will result in increased profits, while 
∆𝑝𝑆 < 0 means that the firms are in a position where they can cut the price of their products, 
and will probably do so because of competition. This is illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
 
The market of interest could for instance be that of filter coffee, and the rightward shift of 
the supply curve caused by an exceptional good year of harvest of coffee beans, reducing 
the cost of producing a bag of coffee. There are several firms supplying this product, but the 
nature of the different firms’ products differ through small differences in their quality, taste, 
design et cetera allowing for small differences in price, but not too large because 
Supply, old 
𝑥 
𝑝 
Supply, new 
∆𝑥𝑆 > 0 
∆𝑝𝑆 < 0 
•  
•  
A 
B 
Figure 4 
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competition still is prevalent.  Some firms will start both increasing their supply and lower 
their price, to steal market shares from their competitors and in general make consumers 
buy more of their product. Other firms more or less voluntary do the same as a response, 
and this process is repeated until point B is reached. How long time the movement from A to 
B takes, will depend on how aggressively the firms cut their prices and how fast they are able 
to increase their production. When only the firms are taken into consideration the allocation 
may in theory move directly from A to B in a single jump. A stepwise transition is also 
possible, depending on behavior and competition. 
 
Independent of the transition being immediate or stepwise, at some point the new supply 
curve will be reached, and thus also from the point of view of the suppliers it can be stated 
that lim
𝑡→∞
𝑥𝑆(𝑡) = 𝑘𝑆𝑥, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 lim
𝑡→∞
𝑝𝑆(𝑡) = 𝑘𝑆𝑝, 
with 𝑘𝑆𝑥 and 𝑘𝑆
𝑝 being constants, meaning that the driving forces for change will settle when 
only the firms are taken into consideration. 
 
To the right of the supply curve the opposite will be the case, meaning that the firms want to 
supply less than what they do given the price, or that they want the price to be higher given 
the amount they already supply. Thus, in this area ∆𝑥𝑆 < 0 and ∆𝑝𝑆 > 0. This will be the 
case until the supply curve is reached, where the change in price and supplied quantum will 
settle. 
 
To conclude: 
- ∆𝑥𝑆 = 0 and ∆𝑝𝑆 = 0 at the sets 𝑆− and 𝑆+ and at the equilibrium point. 
- ∆𝑥𝑆 < 0 and ∆𝑝𝑆 > 0 in Set I, Set IV and Set 𝐷+.  
- ∆𝑥𝑆 > 0 and ∆𝑝𝑆 < 0 in Set II, Set III and Set 𝐷−.  
The same information is summarized in Figure 5, with arrows showing the direction of the 
driving forces. 
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Demand  
𝑥 
𝑝 
Supply 
Equilibrium 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
𝑆+ 
𝑆− 
𝐷− 
𝐷+ 
Figure 5 
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4. The combined driving forces 
 
 
Until now I have described separately how the dynamics of the consumers and firms work. In 
this section I will attempt to see what happens when both driving forces explained in the 
previous section work at the same time, making the system more complex. This will be done 
through a stepwise analysis of what happens in each of the possible sets explained. A 
combination of logical reasoning, intuition and situational scenarios will be used to describe 
how the combined driving forces will interact in this system. I start with the equilibrium 
point as an anchor, before turning to Set I and go counter-clockwise through every set until 
finally Set 𝐷+ completes the circle. As a helpful tool I will include an unrefined figure (Figure 
6) showing the combination of the individual driving forces of the consumers and firms, 
unrefined in the sense that what happens when both groups interact is not yet considered. 
The letters “𝑆” and “𝐷” next to an arrow illustrate that the direction of movement is part of 
the driving force of the suppliers and demanders respectively, and when no letter is added it 
is because the direction of movement is unambiguous. As can be seen from Figure 6, the 
direction of movement in each set is always definite in one factor, either price or quantum. 
In the ambiguous cases, I will discuss which of the demand and supply side of the market will 
be the dominating part in deciding the outcome of realized direction of movement. 
 
 
 
Demand  
𝑥 
𝑝 
Supply 
Equilibrium 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
𝑆+ 
𝑆− 
𝐷− 
𝐷+ 
𝑆 
𝐷 
𝐷 𝑆 
𝐷 
𝑆 
𝑆 𝐷 
Figure 6 
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Before going through the different sets, I will give a short explanation of what decides the 
direction of price movement, as this will be important in some of the coming sets and 
situations. No deviation from the major literature is done here, and in this paper the 
principle of price movements is according to a differential equation put forward by 
Samuelson (1947), 
?̇? = 𝑐𝑧(𝑝), 
where 𝑧(𝑝) is the excess demand function, and 𝑐 > 0 is a constant affecting adjustment 
speed (from Microeconomic theory).To fit this with the model in this paper, I specify a 
discrete version leading to a similar price difference equation: 
𝑝𝑡+1 = 𝑝𝑡 + 𝑐𝑧(𝑝𝑡). 
This means that in cases of excess demand, the price level will grow, while in cases of excess 
supply, the price level will fall. I will elaborate on the mechanics in all the different set 
descriptions below. 
 
4.1 The equilibrium point 
 
The equilibrium point is the only point among all possible allocations where the system is in 
a steady state as long as no exogenous shocks appear. This is clear, as it is the only point 
where ∆𝑥𝐷 = 0, ∆𝑥𝑆 = 0, ∆𝑝𝐷 = 0 and ∆𝑝𝑆 = 0, which can be summarized by simply stating 
∆𝑥 = 0 and ∆𝑝 = 0, and I define 𝑥∗ and 𝑝∗ as the equilibrium levels of quantum and price 
that are realized in the steady state point. At this point, neither the consumers nor the firms 
want any change of allocation given their possibilities. This makes sense, as in static models 
equilibrium is the point where the allocation always dwells, making a sort of agreement 
between the dynamic model in this paper and the static ones. 
 
Yet, the existence of a steady state point is no guarantee that the system of the dynamic 
model is stable in the sense that when it is outside of equilibrium it will always return to this 
stable point. The question of stability will be discussed in section 5, as I in this section only 
look at each set separately and disregard the long term movements between sets. 
 
4.2 Set I 
 
At this set the situation is as follows: 
- ∆𝑥𝐷 < 0 
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- ∆𝑥𝑆 < 0 
- ∆𝑝𝐷 < 0 
- ∆𝑝𝑆 > 0 
 
Since both ∆𝑥𝐷 < 0 and ∆𝑥𝑆 < 0, the direction of movement of realized quantum of the 
good is unambiguous, as both the demanders and suppliers would like the quantum to be 
smaller given the price level. An important question here, however, is who has the most 
power in influencing the scope of reduction in quantum of the good. At all allocations 
(except those sufficiently close to the supply curve) the firms are initially wanting a larger 
reduction of market quantum compared to the consumers because of the lag  in adjustment 
of the demander group, meaning that |∆𝑥𝑆| > |∆𝑥𝐷|, and a number of scenarios are possible. 
Here are three examples: 
- Scenario 1: All firms may simply do cuts of supply so large that they more or less 
reach their individual supply curves, meaning that one at the aggregate level almost 
immediately reaches the aggregate supply curve, with no consideration taken to the 
welfare of the consumers. When below the line of 𝑝∗, the firms may implement this 
strategy to a weaker extent, because they are aware that reaching their individual 
long run equilibrium point will cause them to first cut and then raise their production. 
To prevent having to do too much readjustment of supply, each firm averts cutting 
too much from the start. This strategy, however, requires that the firms have a 
certain level of information about the aggregate market structure and about their 
individual long run supply curves. 
- Scenario 2: Doing adjustments of supply may be costly, making the firms unwilling to 
do extensive cuts in the short run, also causing the firms to adapt gradually to shocks. 
The more costly adjustments are, the slower the supplied amount will change (no 
costs just lead to Scenario 1). Costs in this context may be of a direct kind, expressed 
through the cost function of the firm, or of a more indirect character, such as 
consumers regarding firms that fail to satisfy their demand as “unprofessional” and 
thus making the firm lose customers in the long run. 
- Scenario 3: There may exist an institution that to some degree emphasizes the 
welfare of the consumers, and thus through laws, regulations and other kinds of 
market interventions regulates the market in cases when the firms do not sufficiently 
satisfy the consumers’ demand, forcing the change of supply to also be gradually. The 
stronger this market intervention is, the smaller the change of supply is compared to 
the adjustment of the consumers. 
 
Regardless of scenario, it can be concluded that in Set I, the total effect will be a reduction in 
realized quantum of the good, which can be expressed by stating that ∆𝑥 = ∆𝑥𝑆 < 0. In 
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general when the direction of movement of quantum or price is unambiguous, I will drop the 
small “𝐷” and “𝑆” in the corner of the difference expressions like I have done here. 
 
When it comes to price, the driving forces move in both direction as  ∆𝑝𝐷 < 0 and ∆𝑝𝑆 > 0. 
However, it is plausible to assume that ∆𝑝𝑆 > 0 will dominate because even though the 
consumers prefer to bargain the price level downward, they cannot force the firms to set 
lower prices, and the firms will set their prices higher despite the wishes of the consumers. 
This may either be because the firms gain negative profits because of too high costs 
compared to income, or simply because profit rises as a result of marginally higher prices.  
 
To conclude that ∆𝑝 > 0 in Set I can also be done by using the assumption that ∆𝑝 = 𝑐𝑧(𝑝), 
because of the fact that  | ∆𝑥| = |∆𝑥𝑆| > |∆𝑥𝐷|. Since the reduction in realized quantum is 
larger than what the demanders prefer, current demand will always be higher than supply. I 
use the term “current demand” to underline that it is what the consumers at a certain time 
demand due to a lag of adjustment. This must not be confused with any point along the long 
term demand curve. 
 
One small caveat here is allocations sufficiently close to the supply curve where the situation 
may be that | ∆𝑥| = |∆𝑥𝐷| > |∆𝑥𝑆|, and thus make ∆𝑝 < 0. Intuitively this will happen when 
the consumers’  lower willingness to pay (in combination with competition among firms) 
starts to dominate the price movement, and can only happen in cases where firms have 
positive profits, which may happen in this model. Profit can be positive at allocations close 
to the supply curve (and on the supply curve) because firms are not equal, and thus 
competition is not totally perfect. I expect this situation can only occur so close to the supply 
curve that it will not matter at all, because the next movement of market allocation will then 
cause the system to leave Set I before the price has time to get consequently lower. 
 
Two things are important to note concerning the change of price here. The first is that the 
increase in price will have to be gradual, because no firm can at one instance raise prices too 
much. At any point in time the firms are restricted by a ”scope of price action” (SPA, an 
above bounded set), and to raise prices beyond this will cause a firm to lose enough 
customers to force it out of the market due to competition from other firms. The SPA will be 
wider the more different the firms and their products are, and more narrow the fiercer the 
competition is. 
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Secondly, if the SPA is wide enough to make it possible for firms to increase prices 
extensively, the consumers’ lag of adjustment will not make them “stupid” in the sense that 
they do not react to severe price changes. The expression 𝜕𝑢𝑡/𝜕|∆𝑐𝑡| will be more negative 
the larger the change of price is, which means that the utility functions of the consumers 
have the property that 
𝜕2𝑢𝑡
𝜕|∆𝑐𝑡|𝜕|∆𝑝𝑡| < 0, 
where |∆𝑝𝑡| represent degree of price change at time 𝑡. Thus, the firms cannot use 
temporarily higher price levels as a tool to get short run profit boosts through fooling the 
consumers even if they had the possibility to do so because of a wide SPA. This is why I in 
section 2.2 included |∆𝑝𝑡| in the utility function. 
 
To summarize: 
 In Set I, ∆𝑥𝑡 < 0 and ∆𝑝𝑡 > 0.  
 
4.3 Set 𝑺+ 
 
Along this upper part of the supply curve, we have the following driving forces: 
- ∆𝑥𝐷 < 0 
- ∆𝑥𝑆 = 0 
- ∆𝑝𝐷 < 0 
- ∆𝑝𝑆 = 0 
Only the consumers cause any change in price or quantum; if it is up to the firms to decide, 
no change will occur. 
 
Although the firms do not want any change of realized quantum 𝑥, they cannot prevent the 
consumers from buying less of the good, and thus ∆𝑥𝐷 < 0 dominates, meaning that ∆𝑥 < 0 
will be the case. 
 
When it comes to price, consumers cannot force the firms to reduce the price of their good, 
and at the set of 𝑆+ the firms will not do so since they are at a profit maximizing allocation. 
The consequence is that ∆𝑝𝑆 = 0 will be the dominating part for price movement, which 
means that ∆𝑝 = 0 will be the case. 
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Thus: 
 In Set 𝑆+, ∆𝑥 < 0 and ∆𝑝 = 0. 
 
4.4 Set II 
 
At this set the situation is as follows: 
- ∆𝑥𝐷 < 0 
- ∆𝑥𝑆 > 0 
- ∆𝑝𝐷 < 0 
- ∆𝑝𝑆 < 0 
 
Each allocation in Set II has the property that at the given price level the consumers want to 
reduce their demand over time, while the producers actually prefer to supply more. As in the 
previous case, the firms have no power to enforce a higher demand level, the consumers are 
free to reduce the amount of the market good they buy. ∆𝑥 < 0 will thus be the case also in 
this set. 
 
Both driving forces will cause the price to be reduced, as both ∆𝑝𝐷 < 0 and ∆𝑝𝑆 < 0. The 
explanation is that the consumers get a lower willingness to pay over time, in combination 
with the price level being at levels where firms’ income far exceeds costs, meaning that the 
competitive pressure will cause the firms to cut the price level. 
 
There is an important difference between the behavior of the firms when cutting and when 
raising their price level. Raising the price level has to be done stepwise because of 
consideration of the SPA, as discussed in section 4.2. When it comes to lowering the price 
however, the firms may make severe reductions instantaneously as an aggressive attempt to 
steal market shares. It is likely that if one firm does so, others will have to follow quickly to 
avoid losing too many market shares, and knowing this, all firms will prefer to also make 
price reductions in a stepwise manner. Whether an instantaneous or a stepwise price 
reduction is most likely to occur in reality, depends on how firms behave in this game 
theoretic context, and will not be discussed in more detail here. 
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The main point is to summarize: 
 In Set II, ∆𝑥 < 0 and ∆𝑝 < 0. 
 
4.5 Set 𝑫− 
 
This set is the part of the demand curve above 𝑝∗, and the situation here is as follows: 
- ∆𝑥𝐷 = 0 
- ∆𝑥𝑆 > 0 
- ∆𝑝𝐷 = 0 
- ∆𝑝𝑆 < 0 
 
The argument of what happens to changes in realized quantum in this set is simply a 
repetition of the previous case, because the suppliers cannot force the consumers to buy 
more than they prefer at any given price level, and thus ∆𝑥 = 0 will be the case. 
 
With regards to price, even though the consumers are happy with the current price level 
given their consumption, competition will still drive the price level down. Thus, Set 𝐷− can 
be seen as a pure “consumers’ market”, letting them consume the same amount to a 
reduced price level. 
 
To summarize: 
 In Set 𝐷−, ∆𝑥 = 0 and ∆𝑝 < 0. 
 
4.6 Set III 
 
At this set, we have the following relation: 
- ∆𝑥𝐷 > 0 
- ∆𝑥𝑆 > 0 
- ∆𝑝𝐷 > 0 
- ∆𝑝𝑆 < 0 
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At any price level in this set, the consumers will gradually want to increase their demand, 
and the firms are happy to increase their supply in accordance with this gradual change of 
consumer preferences. Therefore, it can unambiguously be concluded that ∆𝑥 > 0 in this set, 
and it is likely that ∆𝑥 = ∆𝑥𝐷, as it is plausible that ∆𝑥𝐷 takes a lower value than ∆𝑥𝑆, unless 
factors in some way restrict the firms to satisfy the consumers’ demand or that there is costs 
of supply adjustment (see the discussion in section 4.2). 
 
Price movement is different however. Just as in the case of Set I, the driving forces for price 
change go in both directions. Over time, the consumers are willing to pay more for the 
amount of goods they consume, while the producers are in such a position that they for the 
given quantum supplied are able to reduce price without bearing negative profits. Even 
though the firms prefer to set their prices at a higher level and still sell at least the same 
amount, the competition will force them to do the opposite. As long as at least one firm 
starts a price war, the others will have to follow, and even if no one did, the market would 
be so lucrative for the supply side that new firms can easily enter the market and steal 
market shares by setting a considerably lower price. The more fierce competition is, the 
faster the price level will fall. 
 
This suggestion of letting ∆𝑝 < 0 is strengthened by concidering the price change equation 
∆𝑝 = 𝑐𝑧(𝑝), because in Set III, 𝑧(𝑝) is likely to be negative since ∆𝑥𝐷 is likely to be smaller 
than ∆𝑥𝑆, unless there are very high costs of increasing supply in the short run. 
 
To conclude: 
 In Set III, ∆𝑥 > 0 and ∆𝑝 < 0. 
 
4.7 Set 𝑺− 
 
This set makes up the part of the supply curve below 𝑝∗, and here the following is in force: 
- ∆𝑥𝐷 > 0 
- ∆𝑥𝑆 = 0 
- ∆𝑝𝐷 > 0 
- ∆𝑝𝑆 = 0 
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Regarding the question of whether ∆𝑥𝐷 > 0 or ∆𝑥𝑆 = 0 will dominate, the discussion from 
Set I can again be referred to. As long as the firms are free to let supply take any level they 
prefer when the quantum related to the supply curve is lower than what the consumers 
demand, ∆𝑥𝑆 = 0 will dominate so that ∆𝑥 = 0 will be the case. Even if the firms in some 
way are restricted to satisfy the demand of the consumers, it is not obvious that they have 
to commit to any forced increases in supply before leaving the set, since any such action of 
forcing requires a third part with unrealistically precise monitoring abilities. 
 
The movement of price in this set is interesting, and not immediately intuitive. At first, one 
may expect that ∆𝑝𝑆 = 0 will dominate and thus no price movement occurs, because this is 
a natural continuation of the argumentation from Set III, where competition drives the price 
level down. Note however that at the previous set, ∆𝑥𝐷 was assumed to take lower values 
than ∆𝑥𝑆 due to lag in the consumers’ adjustments, while the firms had incentives to raise 
their supply at a faster pace, leading to a situation of excess supply. In Set 𝑆−, on the other 
hand, the firms are satisfied with their current level of supply for the given price level, not 
wanting to adjust, causing a situation of excess demand since ∆𝑥𝐷 > 0. This induces a 
pressure for higher prices, allowing the firms to raise their price level in spite of the 
competitive environment. Therefore, ∆𝑝𝐷 > 0 will be the dominating driving force. 
 
It can thus be summarized: 
 In Set 𝑆−, ∆𝑥 = 0 and ∆𝑝 > 0. 
 
4.8 Set IV 
 
For this set, which is below both the demand and supply curve, the following relations are 
true: 
- ∆𝑥𝐷 > 0 
- ∆𝑥𝑆 < 0 
- ∆𝑝𝐷 > 0 
- ∆𝑝𝑆 > 0 
 
The situation regarding movements of quantum in this set is similar to that of Set 𝑆−, in the 
sense that the consumers want a higher level of quantum than the producers, for any given 
price level.  What really happens in this set is to a high degree dependent on the cost level 
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the firms face when changing their supply, again I will refer to the discussion on the 
scenarios portrayed in section 4.2. 
 
If the firms face no costs in altering their level of supply (Scenario 1), they will simply prefer 
an allocation along the supply curve, and thus immediately cut the quantum of supply in 
accordance with this, taking no regard to the consumers’ demand. Then, it is obvious that 
∆𝑥 < 0 will be the case. 
 
On the other hand, if the firms face some costs in adjusting their supply, the case may be 
quite different. I will explain this through the use of Figure 7. 
 
 
 
Two arrows are drawn from the allocation point A. The arrow 𝐴1 illustrates what typically 
can be the case if the firms do not face any costs at all in their supply adjustment, and the 
allocation will immediately converge to Set 𝑆−. If the firms on the other hand face costs of 
adjustment, they have incentives to make more cautious reductions of supply, to avoid a 
long run overshooting of supply reduction, and instead choose a path like the one marked 
with 𝐴2, reaching the equilibrium point without detours. There is no obvious reason that the 
firms should have knowledge of the allocation of their individual long run demand curve, so 
it is plausible that the movements’ path converges to Set 𝑆− or Set 𝐷+ before reaching the 
𝑥 
𝑝 
𝐷+ 
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Figure 7 
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equilibrium point. In any case, the movements from point A both have the property that 
∆𝑥 < 0. 
 
From point B, two similar arrows are drawn. The arrow 𝐵1 simply illustrates the case of no 
adjustment costs similar to arrow 𝐴1, only from allocation B this time, and again reaching 𝑆− 
immediately. Arrow 𝐵2 is more interesting because it illustrates that if the firms face 
adjustment costs of changing their supply level, an ambiguous relation in the movement of 𝑥 
occurs. In the short run, the firms prefer to reach their individual supply curve. They may 
however understand that in the long run their production will increase from the level 
corresponding to this curve because of the fact that the current quantum for many firms is 
likely to be lower than their individual equilibrium levels, due to the fact that the aggregate 
supply level is lower than the equilibrium level 𝑥∗. If for each firm the adjustment costs of 
first decreasing and then again increasing their supply is higher than the profit loss of 
choosing a path leading directly to their individual equilibrium point, a path like 𝐵2 is likely to 
arise on the aggregate level, and the result will be increased supply already in Set IV. Thus, 
depending on allocation, there is a possibility that ∆𝑥 > 0 in this set. 
 
To summarize: if the firms face no adjustment costs, ∆𝑥 < 0 and convergence towards Set 
𝑆− is likely (unless price is already close to 𝑝∗, then the equilibrium point may be reached at 
once), but if the firms face adjustment costs, they may to a certain degree prefer taking a 
more direct path towards the equilibrium point, meaning that ∆𝑥 < 0 if the current 
quantum is higher than 𝑥∗, and ∆𝑥 > 0 if the opposite is true. 
 
The direction of price movements in this set is unambiguous, as the consumers over time 
will have a higher willingness to pay for the amount they consume, and the firms are in such 
a position that they need and want to raise their price level because of high cost levels 
compared to income at the current allocation. It is therefore clear that ∆𝑝 > 0 in this set. 
 
To conclude: 
 In Set IV, ∆𝑝 > 0  always, while ∆𝑥 < 0 if firms face no adjustment costs or the 
allocation is to the right of 𝑥∗. If firms face adjustment costs, ∆𝑥 > 0 for allocations 
to the left of 𝑥∗. 
 
4.9 Set 𝑫+ 
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This is the last set, and here the following is the case: 
- ∆𝑥𝐷 = 0 
- ∆𝑥𝑆 < 0 
- ∆𝑝𝐷 = 0 
- ∆𝑝𝑆 > 0 
 
The consumers are satisfied with the level they consume at the current price, while the firms 
want to cut their supply. Adjustment costs or not, ∆𝑥 < 0 will be the case as long as the 
firms are free to decide the amount they supply, but the speed of reduction depends on the 
level of adjustment costs. 
 
Since this set is along the demand curve, the consumers are also satisfied with the price level, 
while the firms want to set higher prices, similar to the situation in the previous set. 
Although there is a possibility that the firms immediately raise their price levels, it may be 
more satisfying to assume that the increase in price level will not happen until after the 
reduction in supplied quantum, to be in accordance with the price change difference 
equation ∆𝑝 = 𝑐𝑧(𝑝), meaning that ∆𝑝 = 0 will be the case. It seems plausible that the 
reduction of supply will dominate any potential price raise (due to the fact that firms cannot 
raise their price too much at any point in time) in such a way that Set IV is reached before 
Set I, so that applying ∆𝑝 = 𝑐𝑧(𝑝) will not cause any critical losses of realism. 
 
To summarize: 
 In Set 𝐷+, ∆𝑥 < 0 and ∆𝑝 = 0. 
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5. Stability 
 
Until now I have mostly described the isolated driving forces within each set. Now, the 
attention will be turned to review the whole picture and see how the total dynamic 
movements of market allocation may act. In this part the focus will be on whether or not we 
can expect the system to be stable, while section 6 will concentrate on speed of adjustment. 
 
Section 4 already made it clear that if equilibrium is reached, the whole system will be in a 
steady state since both ∆𝑥 = 0 and ∆𝑝 = 0 at this point. The question of stability is thus a 
question of whether or not the system will ever reach equilibrium when first in 
disequilibrium. To study this, I will include a diagram, Figure 8, illustrating all the updated 
information about the combined driving forces in each set, and use this figure as an anchor 
for the coming discussion. 
 
 
 
What is obvious from Figure 8 is that the system will not be unstable in the sense that when 
outside of the equilibrium point, price and quantum will converge to either infinity or zero. 
All combinations of arrows point towards the steady state allocation, so it seems plausible 
that the movements will either move towards this point, or at least circle around it. In 
section 5.1 I will explain all the possible ways of leaving every set by discussing each one of 
them paragraph by paragraph. I will sum up by drawing a tree in section 5.2. 
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5.1 Possible movements out from each set 
 
Before going through each set, note that some of the possibilities that will be described are 
mostly of theoretical interest, as the probability that an allocation in reality exactly reaches 
the one-dimensional sets is equal to zero. They are still included, both to make the analysis 
theoretically watertight, and because convergence towards the one-dimensional sets often 
will occur. In such cases of convergence, I assume that movements of the market allocation 
will be according to the descriptions of these sets. Thus, in cases where I state that the one-
dimensional sets are reached, this should in reality be interpreted as convergence towards 
these sets. 
 
In Set I, there are six possibilities of sets to arrive at when leaving the area. They will be 
listed: 
- If at or below 𝑝∗, the allocation may move directly to the equilibrium point, either 
stepwise or in an instant if the firms have the possibility to raise price to 𝑝∗ 
immidiately, and cut supply so the supply curve is reached at once. 
- If below 𝑝∗, and the costs of adjustment are non-existing, the firms may cut supply 
extensively so that the Set 𝑆− is reached instantaneously. Remember to interpret this 
as convergence towards the set, as it is unlikely that each individual firm knows 
exactly the location of their supply curve, and the probability of reaching an exact 
point on the curve is thus zero. 
- If below 𝑝∗ and there are costs of adjustment, the level of supply may be cut to such 
an extent that Set IV is reached. 
- If below 𝑝∗ and there are costs of adjustment, the level of supply may be cut to such 
an extent that Set 𝐷+ is reached. 
- If the allocation is above 𝑝∗, the movements will either stepwise or immediately 
reach Set 𝑆+. This set may also in general be reached from any point in Set I as long 
as the firms’ adjustment costs are sufficiently high and they miss the equilibrium 
point. 
- When the allocation is close to the supply curve, the reduced demand of the 
consumers may be sufficiently high to lead the allocation directly to Set II. 
 
In Set 𝑆+ the allocation is almost certain to reach Set II. The only exception is if is close to the 
equilibrium point: then the reduction in the consumers’ demand may in one instance move 
fast enough to reach 𝐷− even though there are lags in their adjustment. 
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From Set II, the movements may either go gradually towards the equilibrium point, or 
instead reach Set 𝐷−. Both cases are possible when the original consumption level is above 
𝑥∗, while only Set 𝐷− can be reached if the consumption level already is below 𝑥∗. I ignore 
the theoretical possibility of prices being cut so fast relative to consumption that the 
allocation returns to Set 𝑆+, because this implies firms cutting prices more than needed, as it 
means they react to the excess supply level the instant before it actually occurs, and the 
firms have no incentives to act in such a way. 
 
In the case of reaching Set 𝐷−, the next movement will in general lead to Set III. Again there 
is an exception at allocations close to the equilibrium point, since there is a possibility that 
prices may be cut so much that Set 𝑆− is reached before Set III. 
 
When in Set III, there are two possibilities for leaving the area. The first, which only occurs 
when the original price level is above 𝑝∗, is that the path step by step goes to the steady 
state point. The second, which may occur for any price level, is that the allocation reaches 
Set 𝑆−. There is also a theoretical possibility that demand grows so fast relative to price 
reduction that Set 𝐷− is again reached, but this will be ignored because it means consumers 
react instantaneously to the price reduction, which contradicts the assumption of lags in 
their adjustment. 
 
In Set 𝑆−, the price is the only factor that will increase, meaning that in general the 
allocation returns to Set III. When close to the equilibrium point, the price can increase 
sufficiently to jump directly to Set 𝐷−. If this happens we may experience a system where 
price forever jumps up and down between the supply and demand curve without quantum 
of realized consumption ever changing, because along the demand curve the consumers will 
not increase their demand, and along the supply curve the firms will not increase their 
supply. However, I do not regard this scenario as plausible, since it requires the firms to 
display very short-term thinking, and in addition it requires a relatively strong increase of 
excess demand, which is likely to be weak close to the equilibrium point. Also, remember 
that it is unlikely to exactly reach any one-dimensional set in reality. I thus rule out this 
theoretical case of infinite price jumps by assuming that only Set III will be reached from Set 
𝑆−. 
 
There are two general possibilities of leaving Set IV. As discussed in section 4.8, the 
movements in this set depend on the degree of adjustment costs the firms face, and the 
higher these are, the higher is the likelihood that the movements will take a path directly 
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towards the equilibrium point, which is the first possibility. The second possibility, which is 
especially likely with low or no adjustment costs (then ∆𝑥 < 0 to all allocations at this set), is 
that the movements instead reach Set 𝑆−, which in theory can happen in an instant in the 
extreme case of no adjustment costs. In the first case, the firms may miss equilibrium 
(because they don´t have perfect information of their individual demand curve’s allocation) 
in such a way that Set 𝐷+ is actually reached, but I ignore this scenario, as it will not have 
any major consequence for the question of stability. 
 
In Set 𝐷+, I simplified by stating that only realized quantum will be reduced, and thus there 
are two possible ways of leaving this set. The first is that firms cut supply so much that the 
allocation goes directly to Set 𝑆−, which is the case related to low or no costs of adjustment 
for the firms. The second occurs with a more modest reduction so that the allocation instead 
reaches Set IV, which is more likely as long as there is some degree of adjustment costs 
facing the firms when they change their level of supply. 
 
5.2 Overview of movements 
 
Now that all of the possible sets are discussed, I will in Figure 9 draw a tree summing up all 
the information, thus making it easier to see the whole picture. In the figure, Set I is used as 
a starting point, and each arrow leaving the box corresponding to this set leads to one of the 
theoretically possible sets from Set I. A similar procedure is then used for each of the next 
sets, causing a branched shape. What I mean by the stippled boxes titled “Already covered” 
is that the branching out from the corresponding set is already covered in another part of 
the tree, and repetition is not necessary. All sets will be covered in the tree, and the boxes 
corresponding to the equilibrium point is the only ones where no further branching occurs. 
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From Figure 9, one can see that no matter where the starting point is, the system will either 
find a path that moves directly to the equilibrium point, or it will inevitable reach or 
converge to Set 𝑆− . This set (or the area close to this set) works as a “drain of convergence” 
where the system converges towards the equilibrium. What happens is that price will raise, 
reaching Set III, but then quantum of realized consumption will increase combined with a 
price reduction, leading either to the equilibrium or again to a convergence to Set 𝑆−, but 
this time closer to the steady state point than what originally was the case. This process will 
be repeated in a stepwise manner until steady state is reached. Thus, it is possible to 
 
Equilibrium 
Set 𝑆− 
Set II 
Set IV 
Set IV 
Set I 
Set 𝑆+ 
 
Set 𝐷+ 
 Set 𝑆
− 
Set 𝑆− 
Set 𝐷+ 
Equilibrium 
Set II 
Set 𝐷− 
Equilibrium 
Set 𝐷− 
Set 𝑆− 
Set III 
Already covered 
Set 𝑆− 
Equilibrium 
Set III 
”Drain of 
convergence” 
Already covered 
Already covered 
Already covered 
Already covered 
Already covered 
Already covered 
Already covered 
Figure 9 
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conclude that the whole system is stable in the sense that the equilibrium point inevitably 
will be reached no matter where the starting point of the original allocation is. 
 
 
Figure 10 and 11 illustrate different scenarios of how the movements towards equilibrium 
may take place. Figure 10 uses Set I as the starting point, while Figure 11 uses Set 𝐷+ as the 
starting point. The solid curve shows the longest path to equilibrium among the paths drawn, 
while the stippled curves show alternative shorter routes. 
 
 
 
 
Demand  
𝑥 
𝑝 
Supply 
•  
Figure 10 
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Conclusion: 
As time goes to infinity, 𝑥 goes towards 𝑥∗ and 𝑝 goes towards 𝑝∗. The system is thus stable, 
and the equilibrium point will be reached. This is conditional on a constant environment, and 
that the firms and consumers do not miss their preferred target consequently. 
 
  
Demand  
𝑥 
𝑝 
Supply 
•  •  •  
Extreme jump Smaller jump 
Figure 11 
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6. Speed of adjustment in disequilibrium 
 
So far I have mostly used an intuitive approach in describing the model, and this has been 
sufficient to argue for the result of stability. In order to discuss the speed of adjustment, 
especially the speed of convergence towards the equilibrium point when in disequilibrium, 
assumptions about the behavior of consumers have to be made, and decisions made as to 
what degree of adjustment costs the firms face. These properties will in reality depend on 
what kind of partial market is studied, the technology of the firms and the subjective 
preferences of the consumers participating in the market, all of which are factors depending 
on both time and location. 
 
6.1 The general case 
 
First I will be very general. The price movement equation has already been specified, and 
takes the following form: 
∆𝑝 = 𝑐𝑧(𝑝). 
 
This equation is however not adapted to the environment of this model, for instance 
because it does not include the possibility that prices are cut faster downward than upward, 
as the firms only have competitive restrictions when increasing price. A more flexible model 
can be made by specifying 𝑐 as a function 𝑐(𝐴) of the current allocation and time, 
𝐴 = (𝑥,𝑝, 𝑡). The size of 𝑐(𝐴) depends on facors such as how equal the firms’ goods are, or 
how fierce competition is. 
 
It is also important to understand that 𝑧(𝑝) is not the expression 𝐷(𝑝) − 𝑆(𝑝), because 
these only consider the long term demand and supply curves, while it is the current demand 
and supply that matters. Thus, it is better to state that 𝑧(𝑝) = 𝑥𝐷 − 𝑥𝑆, and one can in 
addition note that 𝑥 = min(𝑥𝐷 ,𝑥𝑆). 
 
The movements of realized quantum will be according to the following relation: 
∆𝑥 = min(∆𝑥𝐷,∆𝑥𝑆) = min[𝑓(𝐷(𝑝) − 𝑥),𝑔(𝑆(𝑝) − 𝑥)], 
where 𝑓(∗) and 𝑔(∗) have the same sign as their arguments. It is not possible to make 
general statements about how strongly the functions react to changes in their arguments, 
since this depends on the circumstances of the market and its participants. For instance, if 
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one considers it as plausible that consumers first are relative quick to react to price changes, 
but then adapts more slowly as time goes by, then  𝑓(∗) could be of the form 𝑓(∗) =(𝐷(𝑝) − 𝑥)𝜆, where 0 < 𝜆 < 1.The function form of 𝑓(∗) depends on the behaviour of the 
consumers. In the special case 𝜆 = 0, the consumers are perfect creatures of habit, never 
wanting to leave the current consumed quantum, while if 𝜆 = 1, the whole adjustment lag 
of the consumers disappear. 
 
In a similar manner, 𝑔(∗) captures the behavior of the firms, and the function form depends 
on what degree of adjustment costs the firms face. In the extreme case of no adjustment 
costs at all, the function will take the simple form 
𝑔(∗) = 𝑆(𝑝) − 𝑥, 
meaning that the allocation will simply converge to the supply curve in cases when 
∆𝑥𝑆 < ∆𝑥𝐷. With adjustment costs, the function could for instance take a similar form of the 
example given for 𝑓(∗): 
𝑔(∗) = (𝑆(𝑝) − 𝑥)𝜇. 
 
By altering the functions, many interesting properties can be included. The simple examples I 
have given assumes the actors to lack memory; they only care about the previous levels of 
realized quantum.  The functions could of course be extended, for instance in such a way 
that the consumers’ speed of adjustment depends on the original level of consumption, and 
not just on what they recently consumed. 
 
The point is that many properties can be included in the equations, and it is not possible to 
make a universal statement about how the system will behave quantitatively. This is the 
reason why I had a non-technical approach when arguing for the stability of the system, and 
it makes it difficult to say much about speed of adjustment without studying a specific case. 
In the following sections, I will therefore provide different examples and scenarios of how 
speed of adjustment towards stability may occur. 
 
6.2 A case of no adjustment costs for firms, and no lags of adjustment for 
consumers 
 
36 
 
Now I will see what happens in a market where Assumption 2 does not apply, combined with 
letting firms have no costs in cutting or increasing their supply. The following relation will 
apply: 
∆𝑥 = min(∆𝑥𝐷 ,∆𝑥𝑆) = min[𝐷(𝑝) − 𝑥, 𝑆(𝑝) − 𝑥] 
∆𝑝 = 𝑐(𝐴)𝑧(𝑝) 
The price relation is complex because Assumption 3 still applies, and I assume 𝑐(𝐴) to take 
smaller values when 𝑧(𝑝) > 0 compared to when 𝑧(𝑝) < 0, because competition is quite 
fierce. 
 
In this special case, both 𝐷− and 𝑆− will work as drains of convergence, and the speed of the 
convergence towards equilibrium will only depend on the functional form of 𝑐(𝐴) combined 
with the original allocation 𝐴. If 𝐴 is such that 𝑝 > 𝑝∗, then 𝐷− will be reached in one step, if 
𝑝 < 𝑝∗, then 𝑆− will be reached in one step, and if 𝑝 = 𝑝∗, the allocation will reach 
equilibrium at once. When 𝑆− or 𝐷− is reached, the firms will set price higher or lower 
respectively, the latter case going faster by the assumption about 𝑐(𝐴). Demand or supply 
will react instantaneously to the price change, and the allocation thus jumps right back to 
the set without touching Set III, so the result is a stepwise movement along the supply or 
demand curve towards equilibrium, where the size of each jump depends on 𝑐(𝐴). 
 
Below I include three figures, Figure 12-14, illustrating examples of how movements may be 
with the assumptions made. Figure 12  is similar to Figure 10-11, while Figure 13-14 show 
the same relationship, only with focus on quantum and price movements respectively, with 
time along the horizontal axis. All three figures includes one case where 𝑝 > 𝑝∗ and one 
where 𝑝 < 𝑝∗ marked with the label “Path A” and “Path B”, and in both cases 𝑥 > 𝑥∗ 
originally. To understand how the original allocation occurs, think of it as first being an 
equilibrium, but then a shock happens in the economy causing both the supply and demand 
curves to jump so that the allocation suddenly is in Set I. 
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38 
 
 
 
Note that through the assumption on 𝑐(𝐴), it takes longer time to reach equilibrium when 
𝑝 > 𝑝∗. 
 
6.3 A case of no adjustment costs of the firms, but lags in the consumers’ 
adjustment 
 
In this case, Assumption 2 applies, but the firms have no adjustment costs in changing their 
supply level. I choose to use the case of 𝑓(∗) = (𝐷(𝑝) − 𝑥)𝜆, 0 < 𝜆 < 1, meaning that the 
consumers’ adjustment will go faster far away from the demand curve relative to close to 
the demand curve. The difference equations will take the following form: 
∆𝑥 = min(∆𝑥𝐷 ,∆𝑥𝑆) = min[(𝐷(𝑝) − 𝑥)𝜆, 𝑆(𝑝) − 𝑥] 
∆𝑝 = 𝑐(𝐴)𝑧(𝑝) 
How fast the system will move towards equilibrium depends on the size of 𝜆 and 𝑐(𝐴). The 
consumers will have more lags in their adjustment to low values of 𝜆 relative to high values, 
and the price movements are slower to low values of 𝑐(𝐴). 
 
Just as with the case of section 6.2, I will use three figures (Figure 15-17) to illustrate 
movements based on different kind of circumstances. This time, the starting allocation is in 
𝑡 
𝑝 
Path A 
Path B 
𝑝∗ 
Figure 14 
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Set I above 𝑝∗, and I will draw three different movements where the follwing relations will 
be implied: 
- Relation 1: High 𝑐(𝐴) relative to 𝜆. 
- Relation 2: Low 𝑐(𝐴) relative to 𝜆. 
- Relation 3: Low 𝑐(𝐴) relative to 𝜆 in Set II, and opposite in Set III. 
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𝑥 
Relation 1 
Relation 3 
Relation 2 
𝑥∗ 
Demand  
𝑥 
𝑝 
Supply 
•  
•  
•  
•  
•  
•  
•  
•  
•  •  •  
•  
•  •  
Relation 1 
Relation 3 
Relation 2 
Figure 15 
Figure 16 
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It can be seen that in the first relation the combination of 𝜆  and 𝑐(𝐴) works in such a way 
that the path will move directly towards equilibrium. Even within this path however, the 
speed of movement may vary depending on how the combination is, which makes it difficult 
to say something about how long time it takes until equilibrium is reached even when the 
path is known. The other two relations show different ways the system may behave when 
Set III is reached. Relation 3 is probably the path that will take the longest time to reach the 
steady state point. 
 
Also, it is plausible to assume that the movements of Relation 2 and 3 will be slower relative 
to the case in section 6.2, where the consumers had no lags of adjustment at all. 
 
6.4 A case of firms having relatively high adjustment costs 
 
I will include one last case, this time with the firms having such high costs when adjusting 
their supply level that they aim for a path leading directly to equilibrium if they can. This 
implies a low value of 𝜇, and the difference equations will take the following form: 
∆𝑥 = min(∆𝑥𝐷,∆𝑥𝑆) = min [(𝐷(𝑝) − 𝑥)𝜆, (𝑆(𝑝) − 𝑥)𝜇] 
∆𝑝 = 𝑐(𝐴)𝑧(𝑝) 
𝑡 
𝑝 
Relation 1 
Relation 3 
Relation 2 
𝑝∗ 
Figure 17 
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The starting point will be in Set I bellow the 𝑝∗ level, and two paths will be used as examples, 
one going directly to equilibrium, and the other having relatively higher levels of 𝜆 and/or 𝜇 
such that Set IV is reached first. See Figure 18-20 for possible movements. 
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6.5 Concluding remarks 
 
In this section I have included many different paths of how movements towards the 
equilibrium may occur. The major point has been to underline the fact that there exists no 
general path the system will take, and that how the movements go and at what speed 
depend on the relative values of 𝜆, 𝜇 and 𝑐(𝐴), or even more genereal, depend on the forms 
of the functions 𝑓(∗), 𝑔(∗) and 𝑐(𝐴). All these functions depend on the nature of the 
market, the firms and the consumers in consideration. 
 
  
𝑡 
𝑝 
𝑝∗ 
Path A 
Path B 
Figure 20 
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7. Interesting implications in an expanded context 
 
 
So far the focus has been on different ways the system may behave when moving from one 
equilibrium point to another after an exogenous shock, and the approach has thus been to 
look at long term behavior in a short term context.  What I mean by this is that the 
environment is assumed to be static when studying movements over time, and the analysis 
ignores the possibility of the economic environment being exposed to new exogenous 
shocks in the process of movement towards equilibrium. In reality shocks may occur any 
time, often or rare, depending on how stable the market of interest is, and it is highly 
plausible that new changes of allocation of the demand and supply curves happen before 
the system reaches the steady state point. If this is true, it can be very difficult to identify the 
allocation of equilibrium, at least for markets experiencing frequent shocks, and although 
there is a theoretical short term stable point the system moves towards, the market can still 
be subject to long term instability. In the following part of the paper, I will discuss some 
implications of exogenous shocks under transition. 
 
In a market with frequent shocks, it may be very difficult to identify the equilibrium point in 
the context of this model. There is for instance no reason that anybody will be aware of the 
demand curve’s allocation, as it is likely that not even the consumers themselves are aware 
of their individual demand curve, they only recognize what amount of consumption they 
want of a certain good for the current price. A person trying to analyze the market can only 
observe the realized amount consumed, the price level, and maybe the amount the firms 
supply. In cases of excess demand the true value of 𝑧(𝑝) is not observable, but indicators of 
its level may excist. In Figure 21-23 below, I show an example of movements of market 
allocations where the equilibrium point is in different random positions due to frequent 
shocks. I use a case of relatively high adjustment costs of supply change facing the firms, and 
consumers also adjusting slowly. The stipulated line is what I call the ”equilibrium path”, 
showing the unobservable movements of the steady state point towards which the system 
will move in the long run, but maybe never reach before it changes allocation, and the solid 
curves show the true movements of realized market quantum and price. In this example 
with slow adjustments, the solid curve is close to being continuous, and will be so drawn to 
simplify. Along the curve I include information about which set the allocation resides in, and 
mark the places where new shocks occur by notation such as “A→B” (change from 
equilibrium A to B). The long run demand and supply curves are excluded, as the figures 
would become too messy if these curves were included. 
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From this example a number of interesting elements can be noticed: 
• At some time intervals, the distance between the current allocation and the 
equilibrium point may grow larger, even though the long run behavior will be 
movements towards this point. 
• Due to the ”overshooting” property of the system, in the sense that price or quantum 
may move away from equilibrium before getting closer, an analyzer risks loosing 
parts of the whole picture. For instance, after the shift of equilibrium from point A to 
point B, price level will be higher, but the movements  of price start going in the 
opposite direction. Then a new shock occurs bringing the steady state to point C, and 
the movements keep being downward towards this point. In this process, the 
analyzer may totally miss out the fact that equilibrium B existed, as the price 
movement towards this point will not be revealed unless Set 𝐷− is reached. A similar 
case with quantum can also occur, for example if a shock happens in the movements 
from point D towards point E before Set 𝐷− is reached, and the next equilibrium 
causes the quantum to continue being reduced. 
• Note however, that in the framework of this model, it is always possible to identify 
when being in Set III, as it is the only set where price and quantum go down at the 
same time. The same holds for Set II, which is the only set where quantum goes 
down as price also goes down. More uncertainty is surrounding Set I and Set IV (but 
not in the case of Set IV where quantum grows due to firms facing adjustment costs). 
The special ”drain of convergence” around Set 𝑆− and Set III is also easy to identify 
when it occurs. 
𝑡 
𝑝 
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D 
E 
Equilibrium path 
Realized path 
Figure 23 
46 
 
• If shocks happen frequently enough, the system may never be in equilibrium. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
A major conclusion of this paper is that given the circumstances, the system will always 
converge to the equilibrium point in the long run, but if shocks occur, the market allocation 
of price and realized quantum of the good may very well remain in disequilibrium. 
Furthermore, as is clear from section 6, it is not possible to make a precise general 
description of how the movements in disequilibrium behave quantitatively and related to 
speed of convergence to equilibrium, but qualitative conclusions are more easily drawn. In 
order to do a more precise quantitative analysis, a certain market must be chosen, and 
estimation of the difference equations describing movements has to be done through 
empirical data. 
 
Extensions of the model can also be made. For example it could be interesting to see how 
the system changes in the context of a monopoly market, or explore what happens with a 
market where the supply or demand curve is either horizontal or vertical. 
 
As noted in the introduction, the model in this paper is of a speculative nature, and empirical 
research would be an interesting next step to see if it has any reliability. Such research could 
be challenging, however, for instance because it can be difficult to separate movements 
related to the current location of the demand and supply curves from movements due to 
changes of these curves’ location. Additionally, the fact that this paper studies only a partial 
market may cause problems. If  the model nevertheless turns out to have a value in 
explaining some real world markets, it would be a good tool for understanding and 
predicting short term movements of market allocation. 
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9. Appendix on Assumption 3 
 
 
In this section I will discuss Assumption 3, which states that the firms are not perfectly equal. 
First of all, one has to make clear what the meaning of “equal firms” really is, here are some 
suggestions of what the interpretation of equality may be: 
- Equality of technology, or internal equality, which means that Firm A and Firm B face 
the same cost function, but the consumers may still regard their products 𝑥𝐴 and 𝑥𝐵 
as different due to image etc. 
- Equality of products, or external equality, which means that Firm A and Firm B face 
different cost functions, but that the consumers regard their products 𝑥𝐴 and 𝑥𝐵 as 
perfectly equal. 
- Perfect equality, which means that both internal and external equality operate at the 
same time. 
- Ultimate equality, which means that Firm A and Firm B is the same firm, and thus 
that 𝑥𝐴 and 𝑥𝐵 is the same product. 
 
To be more pedantic, one can also distinguish between how goods can be equal. Here, it is 
also possible to distinguish between external equality, meaning differences in how the goods 
are perceived by the consumers, and internal equality, which would somehow mean that the 
goods are equal in function or nature, but are still perceived as unequal due to “vain” 
consumers. One important point of the model in this paper is that firms can have small 
differences in their price level due to differences among them, and in the end the only 
relevant property for the possibility of setting unequal price levels is that the consumers 
perceive the goods as different. Because of this, I will only look at different kinds of external 
equality of goods. Examples are: 
- Dependent equality, meaning that if goods 𝑥𝐴 and 𝑥𝐵 are sold under the exact same 
circumstances (place, time, amount of announcement etc.), the consumers are 
perfectly indifferent to them. 
- Independent equality, meaning that the consumers are perfectly indifferent to goods 
𝑥𝐴 and 𝑥𝐵 no matter under which cirmumstance they are sold. 
- Ultimate equality, meaning that the goods 𝑥𝐴 and 𝑥𝐵 are perceived as equal, and that 
the circumstance under which they are sold are perfectly equal. For most goods this 
simply means that 𝑥𝐴 and 𝑥𝐵 is the same good, because two objects cannot be at the 
exact same location. 
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These are only extreme cases, and in reality approximations are sufficient. Two goods may 
have small differences in circumstances, but not large enough for the consumers to 
distinguish between them. 
 
There are many different ways that the circumstances of goods differ, but in this paper I 
assume that consumers are enough influenced by the marketing of firms to make them 
perceive otherwise similar goods of firms as unequal. Thus, 
Assumption 3 ⇒ Good perceived as unequal, 
in the context of dependent equality. Furthermore, regarding the differences of firms, it 
does not matter for this paper whether this counts as internal equality or not, only external 
equality is relevant. The relation thus becomes: 
Firms in the market do not have external equality ⇒Assumption 3. 
Assumption 3 ⇒ Goods perceived as unequal. 
Goods perceived as unequal ⇒ Room for small differences in price level. 
 
If we neglect Assumption 3 an intriguing situation occurs concerning the price movement 
equation ∆𝑝 = 𝑐(𝐴)𝑧(𝑝) (this equation is introduced in section 6). Since all firms are equal, 
so are their supplied goods, which means that consumers only will buy the goods from the 
firm or firms setting the lowest price level (assuming the consumers to be rational). Thus, in 
a situation such as in Set 𝑆− where ∆𝑝 > 0 is the case, the mechanisms behind these driving 
forces collapse, because there is no way for the firms to raise their price level. If some firms 
want to marginally increase their price level, they will lose all customers, and thus no firm 
can ever raise their price level. An exception would be if they cooperate, but that is not a 
part of this model. 
 
With this argumentation I will give a comment on what is written on page 621 in 
“Microeconomic theory”, where a statement about a relation similar to ∆𝑝 = 𝑐(𝐴)𝑧(𝑝) is 
made: 
“(…) is best thought of not as modeling the actual evolution of a demand-and-supply driven 
economy, but rather as a tentative trial-and-error process taking place in fictional time and 
run by an abstract market agent bent on finding the equilibrium level of prices (…)” 
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This sentence is related to the question of which agent is in charge of prices, and it is further 
stated that the time in the differential equation (they use continuous time) cannot be real 
time since a disequilibrium 𝑝 cannot be compatible with feasibility. My point of view is that 
what really is fictional is a frictionless world, and that it is because of friction (for instance 
through differences in firms’ products) that ∆𝑝 = 𝑐(𝐴)𝑧(𝑝), or its continuous time 
equivalence ?̇? = 𝑐(𝐴)𝑧(𝑝), may apply also in the real world. 
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